CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION LAW

Category: UCL

Second District Holds That Purchasing a Product for the Purposes of Litigation Does Not Constitute Injury in Fact Sufficient to Confer Standing Under the UCL

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The Second District Court of Appeal found that Burger King’s “Transform Your Way” promotional sweepstakes was not a lottery under Penal Code section 319, and that the game pieces were slot machines or punchboards under Penal Code sections 330b and 330c.  McVeigh v. Burger King Corp., B220964, 2010 WL 4056857 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Oct. 18, 2010).  The court also held that purchasing a product for the purposes of litigation did not constitute injury in fact sufficient to confer standing under the Unfair Competition Law.  Id. *1.

Background

Plaintiff went to a Burger King restaurant and asked an employee for a free sweepstakes game piece.  Id. And although the game piece prominently indicated that no purchase was necessary, appellant alleged he was told he could not receive a free chance for a prize unless he bought a value meal.  Id. Plaintiff purchased a value meal and removed a pull-tab game piece from the soda and french fry containers.  Id. The game piece required him to scratch off only one of two concealed areas or the game piece would be voided.  Id. Plaintiff-appellant filed a complaint against Burger King, asserting that Burger King had illegally conducted a lottery in violation of section 319, and it had distributed slot machines or punchboards in violation of section 330c.  Id. Burger King’s business acts or practices allegedly caused appellant and the public unspecified injury, as to which appellant claimed entitlement to relief. Id. Read the rest of this entry »

Ninth Circuit Affirms in All Respects Trial Court’s Entry of Judgment and Award of Attorneys Fees After Jury and Bench Trial of California Labor Code Class Action and FLSA Collective Action Claims

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On Monday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in “all respects” the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment to plaintiffs, a judgment after jury and bench trials, and an award of attorney’s fees to plaintiffs.  Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., Nos. 08-55483, 08-56740, — F.3d —-, 2010 WL 3733568 (9th Cir. Sept. 27, 2010).  Among other things, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff newspaper reporters were non-exempt. (Thank you to Randy Renick for bringing this case to my attention.)

Background

Employees of Chinese Daily News, Inc. (“CDN”), a Chinese-language newspaper, filed suit against CDN on behalf of current, former, and future CDN employees based in CDN’s San Francisco and Monterey Park (Los Angeles), California locations.  Id. *1.  Plaintiffs claimed violations of the FLSA, California’s Labor Code, and California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, alleging that employees were made to work in excess of eight hours per day and forty hours per week. Id. They further alleged that they were wrongfully denied overtime compensation, meal and rest breaks, accurate and itemized wage statements, and penalties for wages due but not promptly paid at termination. Id. The district court certified the FLSA claim as a collective action, and it certified the state-law claims as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) and, alternatively, under Rule 23(b)(3). Id. Read the rest of this entry »

Second District Reverses Denial of Nationwide UCL and FAL Class

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The Second District Court of Appeal, in an unpublished opinion, reversed a trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion to certify a nationwide class in Schlesinger v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Ticketmaster), B224880, 2010 WL 3398844 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Aug. 31, 2010).   Read the rest of this entry »

Second District Holds That Omission of Source of Base Price From Which Discount Taken Is Harmless

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The Second District Court of Appeal, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor a Restoration Hardware, Inc. (RHI) for alleged misrepresentations of the price of RHI’s merchandise at its discount outlet stores.  Heller v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.,  B215218, 2010 WL 3387506 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Aug. 30, 2010).   Plaintiff alleged that RHI outlet stores engaged in a practice of misrepresenting the actual discounts given on furniture.  Id. *1.  Plaintiff contended she purchased at an outlet store an advertised “Del Mar” outdoor chair, which had an original retail price of $750 from which a percentage discount was taken, when in fact the price in RHI’s catalog and on the internet at its website was $685.  Id. Plaintiff’s complaint stated five causes of action: violations of the UCL, the FAL, the CLRA, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud and deceit.

The court affirmed, holding: Read the rest of this entry »

Northern District Finds Certain Terms in Facebook’s Click-Through Contracts Ambiguous for Purposes of 12(b)(6)

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Judge Jeremy Fogel of the Northern District of California granted in part a defendant’s 12(b)(6)motion to dismiss in In re Facebook Advertising Litigation, 2010 WL 3341062 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2010).  Plaintiffs RootZoo, Inc. (“RootZoo”), Steven Price (“Price”), and Matthew Smith (“Smith”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a putative class action arising out of individual contracts between Plaintiffs and Facebook (“Defendant”). Id. *1. RootZoo, Price, and Smith individually entered into “click-through” contracts with Defendant for advertising on its website. Id. Read the rest of this entry »

Treble Recovery Under Civil Code § 3345 Not Limited to CLRA; But It Does Not Apply to an Award of Restitution Under the UCL

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In Clark v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 171, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 876 (Cal. Aug. 9, 2010), senior citizens brought an action against an annuity seller for unfair competition pursuant to BPC 17200, seeking treble recovery.  The Los Angeles Superior Court granted judgment on the pleadings for the annuity seller’s on the treble recovery claim, without leave to amend. Read the rest of this entry »

Central District Denies Class Certification in Ink Jet Toner Class Action

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In Shein v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., No. CV 08-7323 CAS (Ex), 2010 WL 3170788 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2010), Judge Christina Snyder considered and denied a motion for class certification based on a lack of predominance under 23(b)(3).  The court held that “plaintiff fails to demonstrate how he will establish on a class-wide basis that a material amount of ink remained in each class members’ cartridges when the ‘ink out’ messages appeared.”

Plaintiff Steven Shein filed the class action case against defendant Canon U.S.A., Inc. (“Canon”) on November 4, 2008.  On January 2, 2009, plaintiff Shein, joined by plaintiff Jason Insalasco, filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”). In Plaintiffs third amended complaint (“TAC”), Plaintiff alleged three claims: (1) violation of CLRA; (2) violation of UCL; and (3) conversion. On September 22, 2009, the Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s CLRA claim.

On April 12, 2010, plaintiff Insalasco filed the instant motion for class certification. At the hearing, the Court tentatively indicated that it would grant certification as to plaintiff’s UCL claim and deny certification as to plaintiff’s CLRA claim. Upon further review of the record and the positions advanced at oral argument, the Court concluded that plaintiff’s motion for class certification should be denied without prejudice.

Class Definition

Plaintiff sought certification of the following class, with regard to his claims for violation of CLRA and for violation of UCL:

All residents of the State of California who purchased a Canon Pixma series inkjet printer on or after November 4, 2004.

The gravamen of the suit is that these Canon-brand Pixma series inkjet printers uniformly misinform users that “ink has run out” and that they must replace the purportedly empty ink cartridge, when in fact, at the time Canon issues its “ink out” messages, these ink cartridges still contain a significant amount of useable ink.  According to plaintiff, Canon earns a substantial profit from the sale of each cartridge, and thus, employs these deceptive messages in order to increase the sale of replacement ink cartridges.

23(a)

Defendant diputed typicality, but not numerosity, commonality, or, to a substantial degree, adequacy.  With regard to typicality, the court found that “[n]otwithstanding the asserted differences between plaintiff and members of the proposed class, plaintiff’s claims are based on an alleged common course of conduct by Canon whereby defendant’s Pixma inkj et printers prematurely indicate that an ink cartridge is out of ink and needs to be replaced. Therefore, plaintiff’s claims arise from the ‘same event or course of conduct’ as those of the various class members, as required under Rule 23(a)(3), and are typical of the claims of the proposed class.”

23(b)

Plaintiff sought certification under Rule 23(b)(3).  In analyzing predominance and commonality, the court found two “crucial questions”:

(1) whether plaintiff has shown that every printer model in the proposed class displays the same, or substantially the same, “ink out” message; and

(2) the existence of a plausible class-wide method for proving that when these “ink out” messages appear there is in fact a material amount of usable ink remaining in each class members’ printer cartridges, and not only a de minimis amount. Accordingly, the question is whether plaintiff can establish on a class-wide basis the materiality of Canon’s misrepresentations regarding the remaining ink level of the printers in question and that these allegedly deceptive statements caused injury to members of the class.

Despite Canon’s argument that different printer users receive a wide array of messages depending on their printer model and the operating system running on their computer, the Court was unpersuaded that these variations are the type of “material variation” in defendant’s representations regarding the ink level that would render fraud-based claims unsuitable for class treatment.  Citing In re First Alliance Mortgage Co., 471 F.3d 977, 990, 992 (9th Cir.2006) (“The class action mechanism would be impotent if a defendant could escape much of his potential liability for fraud by simply altering the wording or format of his misrepresentations across the class of victims.”). The court concluded that “it appears, that all of the printers plaintiff is seeking to certify issue a substantially similar ‘ink out’ message, combined with the ‘hard stop’ of the printer while receiving that message, and that class members allegedly receive this message before the printer cartridges may in fact be entirely empty.”  Id. *7.

The court then considered whether plaintiff had shown a plausible class-wide method for proving that these “ink out” messages appear when there is in fact a material amount of usable ink remaining in each class members’ printer cartridges, and thus constitute actionable conduct common to the entire Class.

Claim Under the UCL

Plaintiff argued that common issues of law and fact predominate as to his claim under the “fraudulent” prong of the UCL.  The court disagreed, finding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate his basis for establishing that a material amount of ink remained in each class members’ cartridges when the “ink out” messages appeared:

Although “relief under the UCL is available without individualized proof of deception, reliance, and injury,” see Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th at 312, 320, in this case, plaintiff fails to demonstrate how he will establish on a class-wide basis that a material amount of ink remained in each class members’ cartridges when the “ink out” messages appeared. If only a de minimis amount of ink remained at that point, then no misrepresentation or omission was made, and certainly not one that could be deemed material or “likely to deceive” a “reasonable consumer” under the UCL. Plaintiff’s attempt to rely solely on the deposition testimony of Canon’s employee Yamamoto is unavailing. First, the Court is unpersuaded that his testimony can be construed in the way advanced by plaintiff–namely, that Canon concedes that all of its printers are programmed to “compensate” for a 10% margin of tolerance in determining when an “ink out” messages are displayed. Further, the fact that there is a ten percent variance inherent in the printer technology does not address the critical question of whether there is in fact a material amount of useable ink remaining in each class members’ printer cartridges when the “ink out” message appears. Because plaintiff fails to submit any evidence or expert testimony to the contrary, it appears based on the record that whether a printer receives an “ink out” message before, after, or at the same time that the ink in the cartridge has run out is an individual issue of fact that must be determined for each printer. Accordingly, the Court concludes, as to plaintiff’s UCL claim, that common issues of fact do not predominate over individual ones.

Claim under the CLRA

For the same reasons, the court found that plaintiff filed to satisfy the preodminance requirement for his CLRA claim.

In the instant case, the gravamen of plaintiff’s allegations is that Canon’s “ink out” statements and its concealment of the inaccuracy inherent in its ink level detection methods are material enough to compel a reasonable consumer to believe that the ink cartridge is empty and needs to be replaced. However, as noted previously, plaintiff fails to demonstrate how he will establish on a class-wide basis that a material amount of ink remained in each class members’ cartridges when the “ink out” messages appeared. Without such a showing, plaintiff cannot establish that “material misrepresentations were made to the class members [such that] at least an inference of reliance arises as to the entire class.” Mass. Mut., 97 Cal.App. 4th at 1292-93. Thus, the Court concludes that plaintiff fails to satisfy the predominance requirement as to his CLRA claim.

Thus, the court denied certification.

By CHARLES H. JUNG